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This article studies the recent escalation in US-China trade disputes and the implications for 
Sino-US relations. Both structural realism and liberal intuitionalism have paid insufficient 
attention to the evolution of the US-China economic relationships, and this article strives to 
highlight this crucial factor. This article employs a historical and evolutionary perspective to 
examine the transformation of US-China economic relations in the twenty-first century. It 
argues that the US-China economic relations are evolving from a symbiotic but asymmetric 
relationship between 2001 and 2008 towards a more competitive relationship after the 2008 
global financial crisis, especially in the Trump-Xi era. The changing dynamics of US-China 
economic relations as well as the top leaderships’ shifting perceptions of each other create the 
impetus for the transformed Sino-US relations. This article suggests that the recent trade 
tension is embedded in the rising strategic competition between the two countries. 
 









China’s economy has been fast-growing since Deng Xiaoping’s “reform and open up” policy 
in the late 1970s. As the world’s second largest economy, China’s Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) share of global total has continued to grow in the last few decades. One important 
feature of China’s economic rise is that China’s trade surplus with the rest of world, especially 
with the United States (US), increased dramatically after China acceded to the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) in 2001. While this has helped China to integrate into the world, China 
has often been criticized for being a neo-mercantilist country that manipulated its currency to 
boost exports in the twenty-first century [13, 38]. Many US politicians and pundits have blamed 
China for maintaining the renminbi (RMB) at undervalued exchange rates against the US dollar 
to gain unfair trade advantages [12, 18]. 
This dissatisfaction over China’s trade surplus has now evolved into a rapid escalation 
of trade disputes between the US and China in 2018. Under the Trump administration, the US 
has made a series of trade policy announcements, in particular tariffs on China, that 
immediately led to China’s counter measurements. At the time of writing, both sides are locked 
in the ongoing trade disputes and remain unclear whether the negative consequences of trade 
war will spill over into security and ideological domains. The trade disputes have led to serious 
concerns over the negative impact on both the American and Chinese economies as well as the 
global economy at large. This article aims to explain the fundamentals of the escalating US-
China trade disputes and the implications for understanding the broader Sino-US relations. The 
article highlights the evolving nature of Sino-US relations, especially the rising strategic 
competition between China and the US. 
Specifically, this article argues that both the liberal and the realist explanations of 
China’s rise cannot fully capture the evolving nature of Sino-US relations. On the one hand, 
the liberal institutionalists emphasize the positive consequences of the American engagement 
policy and China’s integration into the international liberal order. It is believed that should the 
US reinforce the rules and institutions that Western countries have established over the last 
century, it could ensure that China will accept the existing norms, thereby exercising China’s 
economic power in the existing liberal order [22]. On the other, the structural realists underline 
the inevitable outcome of structural conflict between Beijing and Washington. It is claimed 
that should China continue to grow economically, it will attempt to dominate Asia and the US 
will form a balancing coalition to contain Chinese power, which will ultimately end up with 
intense security competition [35]. 
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Although the existing studies are not without merit, liberal institutionalists and 
structural realists arrive at vastly different readings of the relationship between China and the 
US (or the US-led international order). More importantly, it is worth noting that the liberal 
institutionalist account is only valid under the precondition of a cooperative bilateral economic 
relationship. The liberal institutionalists overlook the possible evolution of US-China 
economic relationships from a cooperative one to a more competitive one, thus failing to 
explain the changing dynamics of Sino-US relations. While structural realists underscore the 
increasingly conflictual nature of US-China relations along with the power transition between 
the two countries, they are largely focused on high-politics issues and do not provide nuanced 
examinations of the changing bilateral economic relations. Therefore, both structural realism 
and liberal intuitionalism have paid insufficient attention to the evolution of the US-China 
economic relationships. 
This article employs a historical and evolutionary approach to examine the 
transformation of Sino-US relations, emphasizing the continuities and changes in US-China 
economic relations. We argue that, though the US and China largely formed a symbiotic but 
asymmetric economic relationship in the early 2000s, the US-China economic relations are 
evolving into a more competitive relationship under the Xi and Trump administrations. The 
US is increasingly concerned with China’s growing competitiveness in high-tech 
manufacturing and its global ambition in leadership. This article aims to highlight the changing 
dynamics of US-China economic relations as well as the top leaderships’ shifting perceptions 
of each other create an impetus for the transformed Sino-US relations, which drive the recent 
escalation of trade disputes. 
The article begins by providing a review of the liberal intuitionalist and structural realist 
accounts of US-China relations and discussing a historical and evolutionary perspective to 
more closely examine the changing dynamics of the bilateral economic relations. Then, the 
following two sections elaborate on the symbiotic but asymmetric nature of US-China 
economic relations from 2001 to 2008 and the increasingly competitive US-China economic 
relationship afterwards respectively. Based on the above analysis, the article continues to 
discuss the implications of the evolving US-China economic relations for Sino-US relations, 






Review of the two mainstream IR theories and the evolutionary perspective 
 
The main debate over Sino-US relations is between two mainstream IR theoretical approaches: 
structural realism and liberal institutionalism. Structural realists believe that Beijing is 
structurally predisposed to challenge Washington for regional domination, and that the US will 
respond by forming a balancing coalition to contain Chinese power. In contrast, liberal 
institutionalists suggest that though the US cannot thwart China’s rise, the US-crafted liberal 
international order will not only survive the power transition but will also be strengthened by 
it [2]. 
Mearsheimer [35], as the representative offensive realist scholar, argues that should 
China continue to grow economically, “great-power politics will return in full force” and “the 
result will be an intense security competition with considerable potential for war”. Allison [1: 
vii] closely reviews the historical metaphor of “the Thucydides Trap” and further suggests that 
“China and the United States are currently on a collision course for war – unless both parties 
take difficult and painful actions to avert it.” From this perspective, the Belt and Road Initiative 
(BRI), as Xi Jinping’s signature foreign policy, is not simply viewed as China’s promotion of 
regional economic integration but more importantly as China’s response to the US “Rebalance 
to Asia” strategy and even China’s grand strategy to establish a Sino-centric order in Eurasia 
[15].  
In contrast, Ikenberry, as the prominent liberal institutionalist scholar, has a firm belief 
that the liberal rule-based order is durable and capable of accommodating the rise of China. 
Though liberal institutionalists admit that the US will probably decline, they insist the 
resilience and durability of the liberal international order will not. Ikenberry [23:6] argues that 
“although the old American-led hegemonic system is troubled, what is striking about liberal 
internationalism is its durability.” Ikenberry [23:9] also claims that Russia and China “may not 
soon or ever fully transform into liberal states, but the expansive and integrative logic of liberal 
international order creates incentives for them to do so – and it forecloses opportunities to 
create alternative global orders.” Specifically, liberals suggest that the increasing trade and 
investment between the US and China promotes the economic development and 
interdependence, which ensures that both countries will exercise their economic power within 
the international liberal order [22,25]. In line with this perspective, Henry Paulson [36], then 
US Secretary of the Treasury, suggests that Washington’s engagement policy is successful, and 
that the US-China economic relations are more productive than ever before. Hence some 
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liberals view China’s BRI as a product of open and inclusive cooperation in the globalization 
era, which is completely different from the realist account [31]. 
Although the two mainstream IR theoretical approaches provide critical insights into 
the future of Sino-US relations and what factors will be influential in determining their course, 
they remain circumscribed due to their opposite conclusions. More importantly, though the 
liberal institutionalists recognize the crisis confronting the American-led liberal international 
order, they claim that it is “a crisis of [US] authority within the old hegemonic organization of 
liberal order, not a crisis in the deep principles of the order itself.”[23] They largely overlook 
the changing nature of US-China economic relations and China’s evolving stance toward the 
liberal international order. The liberal institutionalist account of China’s rise rests on the 
assumption of a cooperative bilateral economic relationship between the US and China. 
However, this assumption should not be taken for granted. As this article will suggest in more 
detail subsequently, the US-China economic relations are not static but dynamic in nature. 
Moreover, faced with the challenges posed by Brexit and the Trump administration, it becomes 
less plausible that the liberal world order will simply survive. It is also less convincing that the 
liberal order is so durable that China simply “does not have the ideas, capacities, or incentives 
to tear down the existing international order and build a new one.”[24] In fact, China has been 
dissatisfied in many ways with the current global institutional presence, which is particularly 
evident in China’s call for reform of the international monetary system and promotion of RMB 
internationalization after the 2008 global financial crisis (GFC) [52]. Many liberals also 
expected an inevitable democratization led by China’s economic development and integration 
into the liberal international order. However, China has been actively exporting its authoritarian 
values. China’s promotion of “internet sovereignty” is a clear example to showcase how China 
has contested global norms to strengthen its authoritarian rule [59]. As such, China’s rise 
nowadays has led to concerns regarding its impact to undermine rather than strengthen the 
liberal norms at the global stages. 
In contrast, the structural realist account of US-China relations takes into consideration 
the power distribution of international system, which is actually changing over time. It well 
explains the increasingly conflictual nature of US-China relations along with the power 
transition between the two countries. However, the structural realist account is very much 
focused on security issues and less attention is paid to the changing bilateral economic relations. 
Shambaugh [40:14] argues that “there is one common dominator across the neorealist spectrum 
– that contemporary and future Sino-American relations have been, and will continue to be, 
characterized predominantly by strategic competition, geopolitical rivalry, and the possibility 
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of military conflict.” This is not claiming that the structural realists downplay the importance 
of economic issues but suggesting that they have not provided nuanced examinations, which is 
of necessity because the US-China relationship is a unique combination of deep 
interdependence, limited cooperation, and increasing competition [40:4-5]. More specifically, 
how do the bilateral economic relationship evolve from a cooperative one to a competitive one? 
To what extent does China’s economy grow to threaten American security? How do the top 
leaderships perceive the evolving bilateral relations? Therefore, the structural realist claim – 
that should China continue to grow economically, there will be intense security competitions 
between China and the US – offers limited insights. In a nutshell, it calls for more close 
examination of the evolving bilateral economic relationships and the implications for the 
broader Sino-US relations. 
Therefore, this article suggests that a historical and evolutionary perspective is helpful 
to incorporate a dimension of time to further examine US-China economic relations. This 
article assumes that the US-China economic relations are not static but dynamic in nature. The 
US-China economic relationship could be adjusted from a more cooperative relationship, such 
as free trade, investments, and technology transfers, to a more competitive one, such as tariffs 
and quotas, investment restrictions, and even economic sanctions. Both structural realism and 
liberal intuitionalism have paid insufficient attention to the evolution of the US-China 
economic relationships, and this article strives to highlight this crucial factor. 1  The 
evolutionary perspective emphasizes the continuities and changes in the US-China economic 
relations. The article proceeds in the two subsequent sections to more specifically analyze the 
evolution of the US-China economic relationships in the twenty-first century. 
Furthermore, it is worth noting that the evolving US-China economic relationships 
from a cooperative one to a competitive one do not directly translate into a more competitive 
Sino-US relationship. The more intense economic competition needs to be perceived and 
assessed by the “foreign policy executives” [32], that is, the Trump and Xi administrations in 
our study. The top leaderships’ perceptions, including Trump’s perception of rising challenge 
from China’s economic aggression and Xi’s perception of China’s international status in the 
                                                     
1 There is substantial literature on the history of Sino-US relations. See, for example, Warren I. Cohen, 
America’s Response to China: A History of Sino-American Relations (Columbia University Press, 2010); Henry 
Kissinger, On China (Penguin, 2012); David Shambaugh, Sino-American strategic relations: from partners to 
competitors, Global Politics and Strategy, 2000, 42(1): 97-115; Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, The Evolution of 
U.S.-China relations, in David L. Shambaugh ed., Tangled Titans: The United States and China (Rowman & 
Littlefield Publishers, 2012); He Kai, Explaining United States-China relations: Neoclassical realism and the 
nexus of threat-interest perceptions, Pacific Review, 2017, 30(2): 133-151. However, they are largely focused on 
security issues and less attention is paid to the changing bilateral economic relations. 
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new era, are important intervening variables in the casual mechanism. The analytical 
framework to understand the US-China trade disputes is shown as follows. The following 
section will examine how the changing dynamics of US-China economic relations as well as 
the top leaderships’ shifting perceptions of each other create an impetus for the transformed 
Sino-US relations, which drive the recent escalation of trade disputes. 
 




The symbiotic but asymmetric US-China economic relationship from 2001 to 2008 
 
This section shows that the US-China economic relationship was more complementary and 
cooperative in nature from 2001 to 2008. The liberal institutionalist account of the relationship 
between China and the US (also the US-led international order) relies on this precondition. 
Specifically, the US and China have formed a symbiotic relationship in the capitalist world 
economy since the late 1990s; the US consumes China’s inexpensive exports and pays China 
in US dollars, and China holds US dollar and Treasury bonds, even providing loans to the US. 
The foundations of the symbiotic US-China economic relations are two-fold: the dollar’s core 
status in the international monetary system and China’s dependence on the dollar and the US 
market. 
On the one hand, the US emerged from the two World Wars to become the 
economically and politically dominant core state. The US specialized in the production of the 
most advanced goods, which involves the use of the most sophisticated technologies and 
capital-intensive production. The dollar has always been the single dominant currency in the 
international monetary system, both in the Bretton Woods system of gold exchange standard 
and in the post-Bretton Woods monetary system of fiat currencies. The international role of the 
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dollar endowed the US with the advantage of issuing dollars as the world trading and reserve 
currency, the willingness of foreign official institutions to purchase and hold US government 
bonds, the privilege of running balance-of-payment deficits without implementing structural 
adjustments like other borrowing countries, and the related and crucial discretion of the Federal 
Reserve to implement expansionary monetary policy to stimulate recessionary economy or 
remove debts with inflation [52]. 
On the other hand, China has followed Japan and the newly industrialized economies 
to stimulate export-oriented growth since Deng Xiaoping’s “reform and opening up” policy in 
the 1980s. China took measures to create a favorable environment for foreign investment and 
business, which facilitated its rapid capital accumulation and export-oriented growth after the 
1980s. China maintained a roughly fixed exchange rate against the dollar from 1994 to 2005 
and allowed very limited appreciation and flexibility in the RMB exchange rate from 2005 to 
2008. After China joined the WTO in 2001, China’s low-cost manufacturing and low-level 
exchange rate together made Chinese goods particularly competitive in the world market, 
which generated large amounts of trade surplus. Furthermore, with China’s increasing trade 
surplus and economic growth, China’s central bank, the People’s Bank of China, faced the 
enormous pressure for currency appreciation and engaged in sterilized interventions by selling 
RMB and buying dollars in the foreign exchange market. The result was the continuous 
expansion of China’s foreign exchange reserves. China also used a part of these foreign 
reserves to purchase US Treasury bonds in order to finance American balance-of-payment 
deficits. Figure 1 depicts the symbiotic US-China economic relationship from 2001 to 2008 as 
follows. 
 
Figure 2: The Symbiotic US-China Economic Relationship from 2001 to 2008 
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Notably, after China’s accession to the WTO membership in 2001, China further 
developed its complementary economic relationship with the US and integrated into the 
capitalist world economy. Figure 2 demonstrates the increasing importance of export-driven 
growth for the Chinese economy from 2001 to 2008. Figure 3 shows China’s overall trade 
surplus and bilateral trade surplus with the US from 1994 to 2008. The real turning point in 
China’s position in global trade and payments took place after 2001. Its trade surplus rose 
sharply from 2003, as did its bilateral trade surplus with the US. Figure 4 shows the 
corresponding dramatic increase of China’s foreign reserves in the twenty-first century. 
Therefore, the symbiotic US-China economic relationship could be seen from the division of 
labor and the flow of commodities, services and capital between the two countries. Some 
observers even perceived the two economies as one, “ChinAmerica”, if the political and 
ideological divergences of the two countries are put aside [27]. 
 
Figure 3: China’s Consumption and Export as Percentages of GDP, 1994-2008 
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Figure 4: China’s Overall Trade Surplus and Bilateral Trade Surplus with the US, 1994-2008 
Source: IMF Direction of Trade Statistics, <http://data.imf.org/?sk=9D6028D4-F14A-464C-
A2F2-59B2CD424B85>. 
 
Figure 5: China’s Foreign Reserves, 1994-2008 
Source: IMF International Financial Statistics, <http://data.imf.org/?sk=5DABAFF2-C5AD-
4D27-A175-1253419C02D1>. 
Furthermore, it is worth noting that China was more vulnerable in the symbiotic 
relationship than the US, which was particularly evident with the outbreak of the 2008 GFC. 
Figure 5 shows the export propensity index of China and the US before the 2008 GFC. The 
index measures the degree of a country’s reliance on the foreign market. China’s export 
propensity index was well above 20% in the twenty-first century and reached 30% from 2004 
to 2008. With a considerably higher export propensity index, the Chinese economy was more 
vulnerable to external shocks, which can be seen from the enormous difficulties faced by its 



































of more than 20% month-by-month for most of 2008, they fell dramatically by 2.2% in 
November (see Figure 6). China’s export-oriented industrialization encountered the external 
shock of the GFC at the end of 2008 and experienced negative growth in 2009. Under the 
severe circumstances, the Chinese government rolled out a series of ad hoc rescue policies, 
including the mega fiscal stimulus plan and expansionary monetary policy in 2009. 
 
Figure 6: Export propensity index of China and the US, 1994-2008 
Source: UN Comtrade Database, <https://comtrade.un.org/> 
 
Figure 7: China’s Monthly Export Growth Rate, 2007–2009 
Source: National Bureau of Statistics, People’s Republic of China, 
<http://data.stats.gov.cn/english/easyquery.htm?cn=A01>. 
Above all, it reflects the symbiotic but asymmetric nature of US–China economic 
relationship from 2001 to 2008. China’s export-driven growth and its accumulation of dollar 
















monetary system and America’s increasing over-drafting consumption and trade deficit. 
Keynes once suggested that “when you owe your bank manager a thousand pounds, you are at 
his mercy; when you owe him a million pounds, he is at your mercy.”[19] This logic applies 
to US-China economic relations as well. China was more vulnerable in the symbiotic 
relationship of its owning making. Chinese leaders were more aware of China’s disadvantaged 
position in the asymmetric US–China economic relationship and intended to make some 




The US-China increasingly competitive economic relationship after 2008 
 
The 2008 GFC marked an important turning point of US-China economic relations, shifting 
the original symbiotic relationship between 2001 and 2008 towards a more competitive one 
after 2008, especially in the Trump-Xi era. This article argues that this is a result of a variety 
of factors including China’s domestic economic reforms and growing ambition in global 
economic governance. The ambitious economic transformation plans at home and abroad put 
forward by the Chinese government have contributed to the growing competing nature of US-
China economic relations. 
The 2008 GFC had an immediate negative effect on Chinese exports and thus 
threatened China’s economic trajectory significantly, revealing the vulnerability of China’s 
export-oriented economic growth model. The Chinese leadership recognized the negative 
consequences of excessive external dependence on the dollar and the foreign market. As such, 
a series of domestic economic reforms has been announced to transform the Chinese economy. 
According to Wen Jiabao, the Premier at the time, the Chinese economy was “unbalanced, 
uncoordinated and unsustainable,” and thus, China needed to restructure and rebalance its 
economy for sustainable growth after the crisis was relieved [53]. Under the current Xi Jinping-
Li Keqiang administration, China has put forward comprehensively deepening reforms, 
including market-price mechanisms, fiscal and taxation systems, land and residence 
registration systems and financial liberalization, all of which aim to enhance China’s economic 
transformation and improvement [54]. Xi also elaborated that the Chinese economy has entered 
a ‘‘new normal’’ that allows a medium-to-high growth rate with more balanced and sustainable 
growth. He clearly aimed to change China’s growth model to one driven by domestic 
consumption and innovation, instead of inexpensive exports and low-efficiency investments 
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[55]. China’s lower target of economic growth, announced by the top leadership, reduced the 
obsession with the GDP and gave more leeway for economic transformation and improvement. 
If successful, this implies that China’s economic growth will become less reliant on the US 
market, or in other words, it may become less “dependent” on the US. To some Chinese 
scholars, this will help to make China less vulnerable when dealing with the US and thus, more 
capable of taking harsh actions towards the US [8, 9]. 
More importantly, China’s reform plans reveal its ambition in competing with global 
leading innovators such as the US. For example, China’s State Council released a national 
blueprint for promoting manufacturing innovation called “Made in China 2025” on 19 May 
2015. The plan identified ten key sectors for China’s innovation-driven development, such as 
new information technology, numerical controlled machine tools and robotics, aerospace 
equipment, and ocean engineering equipment, for China’s innovation-driven development [56]. 
Not only did China demonstrate its plan to steer away from labor-intensive industries to higher-
tech manufacturing but it also shows its ambition to become a global leader in innovation. The 
guideline pledges that “China will be an innovative nation by 2020, an international leader in 
innovation by 2030, and a world powerhouse of scientific and technological innovation by 
2050.”[42] To employ the terms of world-system theory, China has upgraded from periphery 
to semi-periphery after three decades of “reform and open up” policy and is further proceeding 
to semi-core (and even core) in the three decades after the 2008 GFC. Therefore, China’s 
manufacturing products are expected to have more intense competitions with advanced 
industrial countries like the US, Germany, and Japan. 
In the currency domain, the rise of China also represents a challenge to American 
hegemony. China’s concern with the dollar hegemony and intention to reform the international 
monetary system were evident in the landmark essay titled “Reflections on the Reform of the 
International Monetary System” by Zhou Xiaochuan [61], then governor of China’s central 
bank, in March 2009. Though Zhou’s call for the Special Drawing Right (SDR) eventually lost 
momentum as the super-sovereign reserve currency2, the Chinese leadership turned to promote 
the diversification of the international monetary system by pushing the internationalization of 
the RMB, thereby reducing reliance on the dollar. Since 2010, the RMB has played increasing 
roles in cross-border trade and investment settlements. China has also signed a number of 
                                                     
2 There are several institutional limitations and political obstacles that prevented the SDR from challenging the 
dollar. See, for example, Minh Ly, Special drawing rights, the dollar, and the institutionalist approach to reserve 
currency status, Review of International Political Economy 19:2 (2012): 341–362. Gregory Chin, China’s 
Rising Monetary Power, In The Great Wall of Money: Power and Politics in China’s International Monetary 
Relations, ed. Eric Helleiner and Jonathan Kirshner (New York: Cornell University Press, 2014). 
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bilateral currency swap agreements with other central banks or monetary authorities to help the 
RMB become an international reserve currency [37]. Starting from 1 October 2016, the RMB 
is included in the SDR basket, which reflects China’s expanding role in global trade and the 
substantial increase in the international use of the RMB [26]. With the rapid development of 
RMB internationalization, large amounts of literature have shed light on the evolution of the 
international monetary system from a dollar-based monetary system into a multipolar currency 
system [3]. Although the dollar will remain at the apex of the currency pyramid for some time, 
it will not be as dominant as it was in the past, for the same reason that the US will not be as 
dominant economically as it once was in the world economy. 
Moreover, driven by China’s dissatisfaction within its limited power within the IMF, 
China has put forward the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) to fund infrastructure 
projects in Asia. While China claims the AIIB has a supplementary nature, many consider the 
AIIB as China’s challenge to the pillars of the US-crafted global financial order: the IMF and 
the World Bank.3  The story of how China built an alliance to create the AIIB and the US’s 
failure to contain it is another example to highlight the strategic competition between China 
and the US for leadership in global economic governance [11]. 
Along with the AIIB, China under Xi Jinping put forward the initiatives of “the Silk 
Road Economic Belt” and “the 21st-century Maritime Silk Road” in Kazakhstan and Indonesia 
respectively in 2013. To Beijing, China’s BRI is expected to serve the function of bridging the 
reforms across the domestic and international domains. Domestically, it aims to relieve the two 
problems in the Chinese economy, overcapacity and excessive foreign reserve [51], and 
internationally, it aims to further promote the internationalization of the RMB [30]. With 
deepening regional economic integration, not only will the BRI provide new markets for 
China’s manufacturing goods but also boost the RMB internationalization by increasing RMB 
denominated investments and trade. This is not to say that the BRI will necessarily unfold 
according to Beijing’s plan. Nonetheless, the point to emphasize is that this kind of plan creates 
anxiety over China’s global ambition and contributes to the competitive elements of Sino-US 
relations. Under these circumstances, the US-China economic relations are evolving from a 
                                                     
3 For those who view AIIB as challenge to IMF and World Bank, for example, see Paola Subacchi, The AIIB is 
a threat to global economic governance, Foreign Policy, 2015, http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/03/31/the-aiib-is-
a-threat-to-global-economic-governance-china. For those who regard AIIB as supplement to IMF and World 
Bank, for example, see Ren Xiao, China as an institution-builder: the case of the AIIB, Pacific Review 29: 3 
(2016): 435-442. For those who take an evolutionary perspective and provide more nuanced analysis, for 
example, see Jeffrey D. Wilson, The evolution of China’s Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank: from a 
revisionist to status-seeking agenda, International Relations of the Asia Pacific, 19:1 (2019): 147-176; Shahar 
Hameiri and Lee Jones, China challenges global governance? Chinese international development finance and 
the AIIB, International Affairs 94:3 (2018): 573-593. 
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symbiotic relationship between 2001 and 2008 towards a more competitive relationship after 
the 2008 GFC, especially in the Trump-Xi era. The reasons behind the on-going evolution are 
largely from a series of China’s domestic and global economic plans. 
With China’s continued economic transformation, China has been upgrading its exports 
from labor intensive to more capital and technology intensive products, which finds more 
competition with products manufactured in advanced industrial countries like the US, Germany, 
and Japan. With the internationalization of the RMB, China reduces its dependence on the US 
dollar to some extent, at least in regional trade, investment, and reserve currency arrangements. 
The growing roles of the RMB in the global economy indicate that the unipolar, dollar-based 
monetary system is evolving into a multipolar currency system that will exercise better 
discipline over the US dollar. The unfolding of the BRI is claimed to facilitate regional 
development and cooperation to create a favorable environment for China’s economic 
transformation and RMB internationalization. Should the BRI be carried out according to 
Beijing’s plan, there might exist a Sino-centric regional order in Asia. It does not suggest that 
there is guaranteed success for China’s developments in the above three programs, but that the 
process will be accompanied by more intense economic competition between the US and China. 
This growing competitive nature of US-China economic relations after the 2008 GFC 
has also been captured by empirical studies. Caporale, Sova, and Sova confirm the significant 
change in China’s trade structure associated with a shift from labor intensive to capital and 
technology intensive exports [4]. Hamia [20] finds that the competitiveness indices of China’s 
manufactured goods have increased quickly after 2010, surpassing those of US industries in 
international markets. Should “Made in China 2025” be implemented successfully, the gap is 
expected to be further widened. Kwan [29] finds that owing to China’s increasingly 
sophisticated trade structure in recent years, China’s complementarity with the industrialized 
countries (United States, Japan and Germany) has been diminishing while competition with 
the newly industrializing economies (India and Indonesia) and resources countries (Australia 
and Russia) has been decreasing. 
This is, of course, not to say that the US and China have no or little economic 
complementarity presently. Economic indicators such as US-China bilateral trade volume and 
China’s holdings of US Treasury bonds suggest that the two economies are still very important 
economic partners to each other. It would be mistaken to say, at least too early, that the nature 
of US-China economic relations has fundamentally changed at this stage. The emphasis of this 
article is not placed on the transformed consequence but the evolutionary process, in which the 
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US experiences intensified anxiety regarding China’s growing competitiveness. There have 
been several key US government agencies and think-tanks expressing such concerns in 2017. 
For instance, the US-China Economic and Security Commission (USCC) [50] declared 
that “the Chinese government is implementing a comprehensive, long-term industrial strategy 
to ensure its global dominance”. In the USCC’s 2017 annual report submitted to the US 
Congress, “Made in China 2025” is considered to be Beijing’s strategy to make China’s 
companies unfairly more competitive than foreign companies, first at home and then abroad. 
The USCC also views China’s BRI as having strong strategic intentions to expand China’s 
leverage and influence over the strategically important places. Like the USCC, the US Trade 
Representative (USTR) [49] attributed the rising US-China economic competition to China’s 
state-directed approach to achieve dominance in advanced technology. The USTR’s 2017 
annual report to the US Congress raised serious concerns with Made in China 2025, which 
included state intervention and support to promote China’s high-tech industries at the expense 
of foreign enterprises. Members from other government associations and think-tanks, such as 
the National Defense Industrial Association and the Center for Strategic and International 
Studies, also accused China of stealing American intellectual property, which unfairly erodes 
US competitiveness and weakens US industries [45]. 
Above all, China’s growing economic competitiveness has increased the consideration 
of China as a significant threat to the US. As suggested by realists, statesmen are unlikely to 
avert relative-gain considerations, particularly in the process of an economic relationship 
evolving from a symbiotic one to a more competitive one, “each side not only considers its 
individual gain, but also how well it does compared to the other side.”[34] As the following 
section will discuss, this growing American concern with China’s economic competitiveness 
gives rise to a more strategically competitive Sino-US relationship, which sows the seed of 




Strategically competitive Sino-US relationship taking shape 
 
With US-China economic relations evolving from a symbiotic relationship towards a more 
competitive relationship, the Sino-US relationship is undergoing some significant 
transformation as well. While the Bush administration focused on both economic and strategic 
engagement with China, the Obama administration maintained the economic cooperation with 
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China but made some strategic adjustments (“Asia Rebalancing” and then “Pivot to Asia”). In 
contrast, the Trump administration criticized his predecessors for the false premise that 
engagement and cooperation with China would be conducive to productive Sino-US relations. 
The Trump administration is presently concerned with China’s growing economic strength and 
military capability that could erode American prosperity and security; thereby, the 
administration is taking strategic actions to compete with China. 
The 2017 US National Security Strategy (NSS) report represents a significant shift of 
America’s China policy. The White House [46] released the Trump administration’s first NSS 
report in December 2017, and Trump declared that the publication was a milestone for his 
presidency. China was mentioned thirty-three times in Trump’s NSS in 2017, compared with 
twelve times in Obama’s NSS in 2015 (no NSS was produced in 2016). In Obama’s NSS in 
2015, although the US recognized that there would be some competition between the two 
countries, the Obama administration welcomed “the rise of a stable, peaceful, and prosperous 
China” and sought to “develop a constructive relationship with China”.[43] However, Trump’s 
NSS in 2017 clearly pointed out that the US should change the Obama administration’s strategy 
with China: 
“For decades, U.S. policy was rooted in the belief that support for China’s 
rise and for its integration into the post-war international order would 
liberalize China; contrary to our hopes, China expanded its power at the 
expense of the sovereignty of others.”[44] 
Instead, it clearly defined China as a revisionist power with the ambition to expand its 
economic and military influences regionally and globally. The NSS declared that the US must 
be fully prepared to compete with China: “we will raise our competitive game to meet that 
challenge, to protect American interests, and to advance our values.”[44] 
Furthermore, the US Department of Defense issued the National Defense Strategy 
(NSD) in January 2018 to support Trump’s NSS in 2017. The NSD identified China as a 
“strategic competitor that uses predatory economics to coerce its neighbors” and defined “the 
reemergence of long-term, strategic competition by China as the central challenge to U.S. 
prosperity and security.”[48] Accordingly, the NSD declared that “long-term strategic 
competitions with China are the principal priorities for the Department”.[48] 
 It is evident that both the NSS and the NDS reveal that a more strategically competitive 
Sino-US relationship is taking shape under the Trump administration. China’s incremental 
reforms after the 2008 GFC reflect China’s desire to stimulate industrial and technological 
upgrading domestically, to promote the diversification of the international monetary system, 
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and to establish a Sino-centric regional order internationally. From Trump’s perspective, 
China’s economic development and expansion substantially undermines American influence 
and interests in the global political economy. Both the NSS and the NDS suggest that the Trump 
administration will not stand by and let this power transition continue. Instead, Trump has 
overturned his predecessors’ strategy with China and taken a more assertive stance on China. 
 The shifting American perceptions of China have not happened in a vacuum. China has 
also gradually changed its US policy because of the shifting international landscapes. Since the 
late 1980s and early 1990s, Deng Xiaoping’s “keeping a low profile and never seeking for 
leadership” principle has been hailed by the Chinese government as a fundamental principle of 
its foreign policy. This is particularly applicable to (if not specifically designed for) the Sino-
US relationship. On the one hand, maintaining good relations with the US is considered crucial 
to practice this principle. On the other hand, China’s priority lies in domestic economic 
development with little interest in seeking global economic leadership. This has contributed to 
the cooperative nature of Sino-US relations in global governance. 
This principle of “keeping a low profile and never seeking for leadership”, however, 
has been increasingly challenged within China. Many argue that this principle no longer suits 
China’s national interests due to the shifting international landscape [16]. It is argued that the 
size of the Chinese economy has become so large that it has to take on more international 
responsibilities. Thus, China should adopt the principle of “striving for achievement”, which 
suggests a proactive approach to seek global leadership [57]. The financial crisis has advanced 
the debate by giving more credit to those who advocate for abandoning the “keeping a low 
profile” strategy. It has led to an intense debate over the strength of the capitalist world 
economy and the future liberal international order with and without China. The crisis led to the 
reflection of China’s strategic community on China’s role in the global order and the future of 
US leadership.  
Combined with the domestic leadership change, China has gradually indicated 
increasing interests in global economic governance. The idea of a “New Type of Great Power 
Relations” pushed by Xi Jinping’s leadership is a clear example. Arguably, it is “G2” with 
Chinese characteristics in which China plays an equally powerful role with the US in the global 
governance architecture [58]. This is an idea that was clearly rejected by China in 2009. After 
the 2008 GFC, many expected China to play a larger role in global economic governance to 
prevent another global financial crisis. The ideas of “G2” and “Chimerica”, for example, were 
highlighted at the time as alternative global governance models. However, guided by the 
principle of “keeping a low profile”, China clearly rejected those ideas at the time as many 
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argued that China was not ready for global leadership [7]. Nonetheless, the financial crisis led 
to China’s domestic reflections on its limited role in global economic governance. Many argue 
that global economic governance would be very ineffective if China continues its “keeping a 
low profile” approach and remains limited in its contribution or participation in the 
international stage [19]. Since China became the second largest world economy in 2010, the 
size of the Chinese economy determines that it can no longer be a “free rider.” This domestic 
reflection combined with China’s leadership change has led to Xi Jinping’s push for a “New 
Type of Great Power Relations” in 2012. This Chinese-coined concept based on an equal power 
status of bilateral relations marks a different Chinese understanding of Sino-US relations, 
which focused more on asymmetric elements of this bilateral relationship. 
 While the idea of a New Type of Great Power Relations failed to win enthusiastic 
response from the US, it did not prevent China from realizing its ambition in global economic 
governance. Following the shift of its foreign policy principle from “keeping a low profile and 
never seeking for leadership” towards “striving for achievement”, China has gradually become 
an active participant in global economic governance as demonstrated by the aforementioned 
case of the AIIB. This marks a clear departure from Deng Xiaoping’s doctrine of “never seek 
for leadership.” Xi even declared that “we are unprecedentedly close to the center of the world 
stage, unprecedentedly close to achieving the goal of China’s great rejuvenation, and 
unprecedentedly equipped with the ability and confidence to achieve this goal” after 2015 [5]. 
All of these reflect China’s top leadership’s perception of China’s international status as well 
as China’s global ambition shifting from a norm/system taker towards a norm/system maker 
[60]. The increasingly competitive US-China economic relations as well as the top leaderships’ 
shifting perceptions of each other contribute to the growing competitive nature of Sino-US 
relations in the international stage. 
Returning to the recent US-China trade disputes, the US domestic politics and Trump’s 
personality could have important influences on the trade disputes under the rising US-China 
competition, but the article suggests that the trade tension is embedded in the strategic 
competition between the two countries. Based on the above analyses, the US-China trade 
tension is ten percent of an iceberg above the surface of water, as the strategic competition 
between the two countries is the more fundamental ninety percent under water. Garrett [17] 
provides insightful comments that “recent trade skirmishes between China and the United 
States are less about steel and soybeans and more about which country will be the leader in 
global innovation in the 21st century.” Although it remains unclear whether the two countries 
will further escalate the trade war to other issue areas, it can be confidently expected that the 
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trade tension will not be simply resolved by a few rounds of negotiations. A few rounds of 
further escalation are very likely to be on the way. It will be a prolonged and complicated task 







The recent intensified trade tension between the US and China has once again heightened 
global concerns that a trade war between the two largest economies would have serious 
consequences for the world economy. This article has explored the fundamentals of the rapidly 
escalating US-China trade disputes and the implications for Sino-US relations. Based on a 
critical review of the two mainstream IR theories, liberal institutionalism and structural realism, 
this article suggests a historical and evolutionary perspective to incorporate the dimension of 
time to examine US-China economic relations. It shed light on the historical evolution of US-
China economic relations from a symbiotic relationship between 2001 and 2008 towards a 
more competitive relationship after the 2008 GFC. It shows that the driving factors largely 
come from the Chinese government’s ambitious economic transformation plans at home and 
abroad. The Chinese leadership, especially under the Xi administration, also demonstrates the 
confidence in China’s leading role in global economic governance. The evolutionary process 
intensified America’s concern with China’s growing economic competitiveness in high-tech 
manufacturing and its ambition of leadership in global economic governance. There was a clear 
shift in America’s stance toward China at the end of 2017. The latest NSS and NDS clearly 
demonstrated that the Trump administration regarded China as more a strategic competitor than 
an economic partner. 
In this sense, the rapid escalation of trade disputes could be better understood in the 
context of such a more strategically competitive Sino-US relationship. The high-level trade 
talks between the two countries turned out to be quite difficult and inconclusive, and it is 
expected that the trade dispute will not simply be resolved by negotiations. In light of rising 
US-China competition, trade frictions between the two countries are likely to increase under 
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